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Escalation of commitment describes individuals’ tendencies to persist in a chosen course 
of action. The traditional account of escalation of commitment assumes that sunk cost is 
the primary antecedent for this behavior. However, it has been noted that high sunk costs 
are confounded with progress made toward a goal and hidden payoff information. Thus, 
the apparent escalation tendency may be a consequence of goal proximity and 
information search rather than of sunk costs. Experiments 1 and 2 show that individuals’ 
tendencies to escalate reflect the classical goal-gradient effec a t r controlling for the 
sunk costs. Moreover, Experiment 1 also shows that controlling for progress toward the 
goal, increased sunk costs decreases escalation. In addition, Experiment 2 shows that 
individuals attribute more value to the goal as they get closer to it, thus providing an 
alternative explanation for escalation of commitment. Experiments 3a and 3b 
demonstrate that individuals committed to a course also devalue other course of actions 
  
not chosen. These results suggest a new interpretation for escalation of commitment and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Escalation of commitment is the phenomenon of individuals pouring additional 
resources into a course of action in which they have already invested in pursuit of their 
goal (Staw, 1981; 1997). For example, individuals tended to overbid as they spend more 
time bidding (Ku, Galinsky, & Murnighan, 2006; Ku, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2005). In 
the most extreme case, individuals who have been bidding for a dollar often offer more 
than a dollar (Teager, 1980). The traditional account of escalation of commitment 
assumes that sunk cost is the primary antecedent for escalation of commitment (e.g., 
Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Arkes & Ayton, 1999; Garland, 1990; Garland & Newport, 1991; 
Staw, 1981, 1997). Such behavior is considered economically irrational because 
decisions should be made based upon the expected benefits and costs of each incremental 
investment, not on how much has been invested in the past.  
Various theories exist to explain the robust link between sunk costs and escalation 
of commitment. Some prominent ones include self-justification (Brockner, 1992), 
personal responsibility (Staw, 1976), reluctance to appear wasteful (Arkes & Blumer, 
1985), and self-efficacy (Whyte, Saks, & Hook, 1997; Singer & Singer, 1986). These 
accounts rely on cognitive dissonance theory in that abandoning past investments would 
force individuals to admit that they made their decisions in error, thus creating a 
psychological feeling of discomfort (Festinger, 1957; Staw, Barsade, & Koput, 1995). 
According to this account, to reduce this feeling, the person unconsciously justifies or 
rationalizes the prior decision and in essence concludes it was justified. Therefore, when 
a decision-maker has chosen a course of action that later becomes undesirable, the 




instead of withdrawing from it, resulting in escalation of commitment. The cognitive 
dissonance perspective is retrospective in that individuals are presumed to escalate their 
commitment in order to justify sunk costs they have accrued in the past.  
The Role of Sunk Costs in Escalation of Commitment 
Recently, the robust link between sunk costs and escalation has since been doubted. 
Zikmund-Fisher (2004) and McCain (1986) found that individuals showed that an 
increase in sunk costs engendered a greater tendency to quit, contrary to the sunk cost  
account. The proponents of the project-completion hypothesis suggested that the robust 
link between sunk costs and escalation is due to the natural confound between sunk costs 
and distance from the goal, in that in the absence of information on goal distance, 
individuals interpret higher sunk costs as indicating decreased distance from the goal, 
driving individuals to focus on goal completion rather than making economic calculations 
(Boehne & Paese, 2000; Brockner, Shaw, & Rubin, 1979; Conlon & Garland, 1993; 
Garland & Conlon, 1998). This change in focus causes individuals to disregard both 
economic rationality and sunk costs. They further noted that individuals ignored sunk 
costs when they had information about their progress toward the goal, and that higher 
levels of sunk costs did not increase individuals’ tendencies to escalate if they knew they 
had made no progress.  
Under the project-completion theory, proximity to completion determines 
individuals’ decisions to escalate commitment and sunk cost magnitude has no effect 
because individuals ignore economic consequences and focus only on project completion. 
To test the hypothesis, Boehne and Paese (2000) conducted a series of experiment in 




cost in a project that was either 10% or 90% complete. The results showed that 
participants were willing to make additional investment in the project if it was 90% 
complete, but not if it was 10% complete, while the level of sunk costs had no effect. The 
project-completion hypothesis is a prospective account of escalation, based on goal 
attainment and distance to completion, in contrast to the retrospective account based on 
actions taken in the past. In short, the project-completion hypothesis posits that sunk cost 
creates escalation only when information on goal progress is hidden, and this relationship 
disappears once the information on progress is revealed. 
There is also the question of whether escalation of commitment is irrational. Prior 
research that shows a robust relationship between sunk costs and escalation fails t  
control many factors, such as economic consequence of escalation. Clearly, esclation of 
commitment cannot be regarded as irrational decision-making when information on goal 
distance and the potential payoff of escalation are opaque. Some researchers have found 
when such information is hidden, individuals escalated due to the need for reducing the 
uncertainty and ambiguity of investing (Kernan & Lord, 1988). Heath (1995) 
demonstrated that participants withdrew more quickly if they could track the total amount 
of sunk costs and payoffs. The author found that individuals withdrew from their chosen 
course of action more often when potential benefits were revealed than when they were 
not. They assumed that individuals treated the explicit information on the potential 
benefits of additional investments as mental accounts. According to the mental 
accounting framework, individuals avoid over-consumption by setting aside a pre-
determined level of spending (Heath & Soll, 1996; Thaler, 1985), and the potential payoff 




escalating when sunk costs threatened to surpass the expected payoff. Since high sunk 
costs depleted the mental account more quickly than low sunk costs do, commitment 
escalation was more pronounced when sunk costs are low. In summary, as more 
information about the progress and benefits are revealed, individuals showed a greater 
tendency to withdraw from their chosen course of action as sunk costs increased (Kernan 
& Lord, 1988; McCain, 1986; Zikmund-Fisher, 2004). In addition, Heath (1995, 
Experiment 3) showed that higher sunk costs only led to higher irrational escalation 
tendency when the information on expected payoff on goal completion was omitted. The 
author showed that participants assumed the amount they invested would lead to higher 
payoff when information on the potential payoff for attaining the goal is missing, an 
argument similar to those raised by the proponents of project-completion hypothesis in 
that individuals interpreted high sunk costs as greater proximity to the goal. 
Taken together, past research suggests that the robust link between sunk costs and 
escalation can be explained by information search and there is little evidence to suggest 
that escalation in the face of sunk costs is irrational. This present a serious issue to 
escalation research as the most compelling examples of escalation comes fro  studies in 
which subjects are presented with vignettes describing an investment project without 
information on progress toward completion and potential payoffs. Interpreting 
individuals’ tendencies to irrationally escalate based on their willingness to invest may be 
problematic because participants are more optimistic and perceive higher marginal 
benefits when firms or individuals invest a large amount, and hence should receive more 
payoff. For example, a commonly used investment scenario (Staw, 1976) had participants 




were faced with the task of determining the allocation of financial resources for research 
and development. The company was structured into two main divisions, consumer 
products and industrial products. Half of the participants decided, by themselves, which 
division should receive a $10 million investment. The other half of the participants was 
informed that the previous vice president had already invested $10 million in one of the 
two divisions. Then, for all participants, the chosen division that received the investment 
was simulated to have poor performance for the next five years and needed addition l 
funding. Staw (1976) showed that participants who made the decision to invest as a vice 
president invested more money in the failing division than did those who inherited the 
vice president position. This robust pattern has been replicated under different contexs 
(e.g., Bazerman, Giuliano, & Appelman, 1984). Additional research has shown that 
individuals who selected the division in which to invest gave a larger sum than those who 
did not chose, because they had a stronger preference for the division as indicated by 
their attributing more value to it (Schultz-Hardt, Thurow-Kroning, & Frey, 2009). 
Therefore, the lack of explicit payoff and cost information prevented researchers from 
determining whether investing additional resources into the same course of action is an 
irrational decision by examining the choice alone. 
In addition to providing information on progress and potential payoffs, the 
consequence of each incremental investment must also be revealed so that decision-
makers can judge the benefits of incremental investments and adjust their prior beliefs 
about their chance for success. Traditional scenario-based escalation research, uch as the 
theater ticket and investment options, omitted such information and did not allow 




determining whether escalation was irrational or due to a failure to readjust their prior 
beliefs given new information (Camerer & Weber, 1999). This omission might cause the 
divergent results on escalation research in which designs using repeated measures yielded 
de-escalation under high sunk costs while paradigms using one-investment period 
scenarios showed the opposite results (e.g., Garland, Sandefur, & Rogers, 1990; Heath, 
1995).  
Transparency of Sunk Costs  
Heath (1995) contended that escalation would ensue when sunk costs are hidden 
because individuals would not be able to track the total amount of expenditures in 
relation to the potential payoff, so the mental budget would never be breached. This leads 
to the possibility that sunk costs in terms of effort and time can create irrational 
escalation. However, Soman (2001) provided the only experimental evidence to show 
that time did not produce irrational escalation of commitment. The author argued that 
individuals rarely consider any non-monetary investments as costs, nor would they view 
potential payoff in terms of saved time and effort as benefits. Therefore, individuals saw 
little need to justify sunk costs invested in the past, which mitigated individuals’ 
tendencies to escalate. 
This pattern of results further suggests that sunk costs do not necessarily lead 
individuals to escalate commitment and the transparency of sunk costs does not change 
individuals’ tendencies to escalate. The results also suggest that the past rese rch that 
documents escalation of commitment do not extend to instances where sunk costs are 




instances when irrational escalation occurs, and provides a conceptual model to explain 
the underlying mechanism behind irrational escalation of commitment. 
Current Research 
Past research on escalation of commitment has not effectively shown that investing 
additional resources into the same course of action is irrational and evidence on the link 
between sunk costs and escalation of commitment is mixed. Escalation of commitment is 
defined as tendencies to focus on the past costs instead of future payoffs to justify 
additional investments, but past research on escalation fails to provide information on 
future payoffs. The purported escalation effect disappears in cases where future payoffs 
are transparent. To account for this pattern, proponents of the project-completion model 
posit that goal distance plays a critical role in irrational escalation becaus  reduced goal 
distance draws attention to reaching the goal rather than receiving the economi  
consequences (Boehne & Paese, 2000; Brockner et al., 1979; Conlon & Garland, 1993; 
Garland & Conlon, 1998). However, because the potential payoff for completing the 
project and the saliency of the goal were not examined by the authors, the validity of the 
assumption is unknown. The link between goal proximity and escalation might be due to 
an individual’s increasing confidence that the goal will be completed. When decision-
makers first invest in a project, the probability of finishing it is low, but increases  
distance from the goal decreases. He and Mittal (2007) has found that escalation tendency 
depends primarily on the need to gain information about the feasibility in completing the 
course of action and the need for such information reduces as participants progressed 
toward the completion of the project. Therefore, the link between escalation and goal 




need for information search and confidence in completing the project, and cannot be 
interpreted as irrational decision-making. 
The brief literature review therefore suggests that there is no direct relationship 
between sunk costs and escalation of commitment. The goal of the current research is to 
provide an alternative account to explain the underlying mechanism behind irrational 
escalation when sunk costs and economic consequence of escalation are either 
transparent or opaque. I rely on the classical goal-gradient hypothesis (Hull, 1932) to 
explain individuals’ tendencies to escalate regardless of whether the payoffs nd costs are 
explicit or hidden. The original goal-gradient hypothesis addressed the observation th t 
an organism’s speed of locomotion increases as it approaches the goal. This paper 
proposes that motivation for the goal increases as distance from it decreases b cause the 
decreased distance causes the goal to become more valuable to the individual relative to 
the costs or other objects or. In sharp contrasts to the sunk costs account, which posits 
that individuals have the tendency to escalate to recover what have been invested, the 
alternative account stipulates that irrational escalation is real, and that the antecedent for 
it to occur is based on how individuals value the chosen course of action. 
In sum, individuals have a strong tendency to complete the project they have 
invested in, and are willing to escalate irrationally to do so according to the project-
completion hypothesis. More important, results showed that this tendency was not from 
the level of sunk costs incurred from the past, but how close individuals are from its 
completion. I presume that the amount of resources individuals spend in their committed 
course would increase commensurate with the distance remaining from completing th  




distance as described by the goal-gradient hypothesis. Based on this hypothesis, the paper 
aims to address mechanisms influencing individuals’ decisions to irrationally escalate 
commitment by examining situations where resources into the same course action would 
yield no additional benefits. More important, it also seeks to address the relationship 
between the evaluation of the goal and individuals’ tendencies to escalate commitment. 
Specifically, I hypothesize that the tendency to irrational escalate is not related to the 
amount of sunk cost, but rather is captured by the classical empirical relationship between 
goal proximity and motivation known as the goal-gradient hypothesis.  
Research on goal has shown that as the task completion is closer, the desirability of 
its completion increases, and task completion has its own implicit satisfaction, the 
imminent closure of interim objectives takes oh a motive force that may augment or 
supplement the original motive strength embodied within the final task or project 
(Atkinson & Birch, 1974; Atkinson & Cartwright, 1964). It appears that irrational 
escalation should be captured by the motivation to complete the project. In addition, 
classical theories on human motivation support this contention. Dynamics model of 
motivation posits that the drive for task closure increases as the goal is approached 
(Atkinson, 1957; Lewin, 1935). According to Lewin (1935), the need to complete a task 
functions much like biological needs in that individuals sought to reduce them. The need 
also increases as the its completion gets closer, which in turn influences the constru tion 
of preference formation by changing the values individuals placed on the object’s 
instrumentality in satisfying those needs (McClelland, 1961). Individuals are therefore 
more inclined to invest in a course of action as the potential closure of the task draw 




The closer the task completion should cause higher need, thereby driving individuals to 
irrationally escalate.  
More current theories such t e cybernetic control model asserts that individuals 
have positive affect when their rate of progress toward the goal surpasses a elf-generated 
criterion, which motivates them to exert additional effort into the same goal (Carver & 
Scheier, 1990). Heath, Larrick, and Wu (1999) propose that the pattern in which 
individuals showed a greater tendency to expend effort as the goal nears is a result of the 
diminishing sensitivity of prospect theory’s value function. Recently, Kivetz, Urminsky, 
& Zheng (2006) demonstrated that the increase in motivation due to goal proximity could 
be translated into various consumer behaviors. When a reward was contingent on the 
number of purchases, customers made more purchases, became more loyal to a brand, 
and accelerated the purchasing frequency, as they came near the bonus reward. The 
pattern showed that customers were more likely to reengage in the same course of action 
(behavior) in order to attain the reward. Finally, the project-completion hypothesis 
provides some support that the drive to complete the goal displaced economic concerns 
and propel individuals to escalate as they move closer to the goal. 
In summary, this paper proposes an alternative explanation for escalation of 
commitment when costs and payoffs are either opaque or transparent. Instead of relying 
on the sunk costs account, I contend that individuals’ tendencies to escalate depend on 
the subjective value of the project that is influenced by the distance from completing th  






Chapter 2: Experiment 1 
 
Prior research has shown that the escalation tendency disappears when payoffs and 
progress from the goal are transparent to the decision-makers. Experiment 1 tests the 
hypothesis that, despite transparent information on payoffs and progress, as individuals 
make greater progress toward the goal, they will spend an increasing amount of resources 
to complete the goal, independent of the level of sunk costs. Experiment 1 also aims to 
show that the level of expenditure moves beyond what is economically rational, despite 
the fact that the economic consequences and goal progress are apparent to the decision-
makers.  
Participants in Experiment 1 chose whether to draw a ball from a bingo cage in 
order to draw ball number 1 (henceforth the “winning ball” – WB), with which they 
could gain bonus experimental points. As will be explained below, draws usually, but not 
always were costly. Moreover, the paradigm was constructed such that the benefit of 
attaining the goal (i.e., drawing the WB) exceeded the cost of taking another draw only 
through the seventh costly draw, after which it was irrational to continue. The primary 
dependent variable, reflecting level of commitment escalation, was the number of times 
participants paid to draw a ball from the cage (i.e., the number of “costly draws”). A 
secondary dependent variable was the proportion of trials on which participants 
irrationally took more than seven costly draws given the opportunity to do so. 
Method 
Participants.  One hundred eighty-six undergraduates from University of Maryland 




Design and Procedure.  Participants began the experiment with 5,000 experimental 
points, which carried no monetary values in that points earned and lost in the experiment 
could not be exchanged for money.1 The study was a 2 (free draws: 5 vs. 0) x 2 (sunk 
costs: high vs. low) x 30 (trials) mixed design with repeated measure on the last factor. 
There were 30 trials in the study and participants could win experimental points on each 
trial. On each trial, participants had up to 10 chances to pay experimental points to draw
balls from the bingo cage in an attempt to draw the WB for a payoff.  
The number of free draws was manipulated by the number of balls in the bingo cage 
at the beginning of each trial. Participants in the 0-free condition began their trials with 
10 balls in the bingo cage whereas those in the 5-free condition began with 15 balls, but 
could drew the first five balls for free. After free draws were exhausted, each subsequent 
draw became costly in that participants had to pay experimental points in order to take it.  
The charge for drawing costly balls was greater in the high than the low sunk cost 
condition. The costs were set such that in the high sunk cost condition, the marginal 
return of the first costly draw was 130% of the marginal cost. The marginal return 
decreased by five percentage points per draw thereafter through the seventh costly draw. 
In the low sunk cost condition, the marginal return was 340% of the marginal cost on the 
first draw, and decreased by 40 percentage points per draw thereafter through t e seventh 
costly draw. The decrease in marginal return in both conditions was such that on that 
                                                
1 As Heath (1995) has noted, an initial endowment may engender the “house 
money effect” and create a greater risk-taking behavior (Thaler & Johnson, 1990). 
However, our main interest is in the difference of the degree of escalation between 





draw, the marginal return in both high and low sunk costs condition was 98% of the 
marginal cost. The marginal return decreased by an additional two percentage points 
thereafter, making additional costly draws beyond the seventh economically irrational. 
The total cost paid to the experimenter also surpassed the total amount of payoff that 
could be won in the final three costly draws.  
Figure 1 provides an example of low sunk costs condition. On the first costly draw, 
the cost for drawing the first bingo ball out of the cage cost 38 experimental points. The 
marginal return for making the first costly draw was 50 points (.10 x 500), the marginal 
return was therefore approximately 130% of the marginal cost (50/38 =  1.31). In 
contrast, those in the low sunk costs condition could draw the first costly ball by paying 
only 15 experimental points. Because the cost for drawing a bingo ball was alway lo er 
in the low sunk costs condition, individuals would invest fewer points to draw the WB 
out of the bingo cage in the low, compared to the high, sunk costs condition. But because 
the cost of a draw increased (marginal return decreased) at a faster rate, the point of 
economic irrationality was reached at the same point. 
The order of the 30 trials was determined by a deck of 30 cards, which each showed 
the cost of successive costly draws from the bingo cage and the payoff for drawing the 
WB for that trial. The cards were shuffled in front the participants to ensure that they 
knew the costs and payoffs were in random order. For each trial, participants chose 
sequentially whether to pay for the next draw or to stop. If they chose to draw and the 
WB was drawn, then they received experimental points; otherwise, they decided whether 
to purchase another draw. The balls were not replaced. A trial ended and the next one 




Before each drawing of the bingo ball, the experimenter showed the participant the to al 
cost incurred up to that point on that trial. The experimenter calculated and showed t e 
gain (or loss) to participants when a trial ended.  
Results 
The dependent measure is the average number of costly draws across all trialin 
which participants either stopped voluntarily or exhausted every bingo ball in the cage. 
We ignored the event-terminated trials (i.e., when trials were terminated due to the 
drawing of the winning ball) in our analysis, as they underestimate the participan s’ 
intentions. We call this variable the adjusted number of costly draw.,2 In addition, seven 
participants were excluded from data analysis (five from the 5- and two from the 0-free-
balls condition), two because they refused to purchase any draws and five because they 
won the WB on every trial.  
Tendencies to make additional investments.  The adjusted number of costly draws 
provides a measure of the general degree of escalation. A 2 (free draws: 0 vs. 5) x 2 (sunk 
costs: high vs. low) between-group ANOVA with the mean number of draws as the 
dependent variable showed very similar results as those obtained from the mixed 
                                                
2 Even this adjusted number underestimates the dependent measure that is of ideal 
interest, which is the unobservable number of costly draws participants would have taken 
ended all trials voluntarily, although the extent of underestimation is far less than would 
be the case if those trials were included (see Pleskac, Wallsten, & Lejuez, 2008). 
However, because our concern is with differences in the degree of escalation between 
conditions, not in the absolute values of individual’s decisions, the conclusions in this 




ANOVA, which included trials as a within-subject variable, so I report only the simpler 
analysis. There was a significant main effect due to number of free draws, F(1, 175) = 
5.12, p < .03, η2= .03. As predicted by our hypotheses, participants in the 5-free 
condition drew more costly bingo balls (M = 5.32) than those in the 0- free condition (M 
= 4.75). Contrary to the goal-substitution hypothesis, the sunk costs condition was 
significant, F(1, 175) = 4.45, p < .04, η2= .03, where participants in the low sunk costs 
condition persisted with costly draws longer on average (M = 5.30) than those in the high 
sunk costs condition (M = 4.80).3 The interaction was not significant. 
A discrete-time survival analysis with dummy trial variables to account for the 
time-varying heterogeneity and dependency across the 30 trials that could have affected 
an individual’s decision to quit yielded significant effects on number of costly draws due 
to the number of prior free draws, β = -2.36, SE = .22, p < .001, evidencing that the initial 
free draws increased the willingness to accept higher amount of costs necessary to draw 
the WB. Consistent with the ANOVA results, the level of sunk costs, β = -3.10, SE = .26, 
                                                
3 According to the mental accounting framework, individuals avoid over-
consumption by setting aside resources for different goals (Heath & Soll, 1996; Thaler, 
1985). Since high sunk costs deplete the mental account more quickly than low sunk 
costs do, commitment escalation should be more pronounced when sunk costs are low. 
Heath (Experiment 2, 1995) first demonstrated this effect in that participants withdrew 
more quickly when their mental account was depleted more rapidly by high sunk costs. 





p < .001, was also significant, indicating that the high, rather than low, sunk costs 
condition reduced the likelihood that the participants would irrationally escalate. 
Likelihood of irrationally investing additional resources.  To examine whether 
individuals were more likely to escalate irrationally when they have completed a greater 
proportion of the goal, we created a new dependent variable that took on the value of 1 on 
trials that continued (irrationally) beyond the fourth from the last ball in the cag, and 0 
otherwise. All trials were included in this analysis, except for the two participants who 
refused to draw any costly balls from the bingo cage throughout the experiment. We used 
Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE; Hardin & Hilbe, 2002) and entered both sunk 
costs and number of free draws as predictors. The only significant effect on decisions to 
continue drawing from the cage when three balls were remaining was 0 versus 5 balls in 
the cage, β = .51, SE = .21, p < .02. 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 distinguished an individual’s decision to make additional investments 
from his or her tendency to irrationally escalate despite knowledge of the true costs, 
payoffs, and the likelihood of attaining the winning ball (easily inferred from the number 
of balls remaining in the bingo cage). The results showed that only the number of balls in
the cage had the effect on individuals’ tendencies to irrationally escalate. The results are 
consistent with the claim that the tendency to escalate commitment is due to an incre sed 
motivational strength as predicted by the goal-gradient hypothesis. In the experiment, the 
costs in the 5-free draw and 0-free-draw conditions were identical; and were set such that 
it was rational to stop when only three balls remained in the cage, at which point the cost 




free-draw condition took more costly draws and evidenced greater irrationality th n did 
those in the 0-free-draw condition. Note that participants in the 5-free ball condition 
contemplating whether to draw their sixth ball and those in the 0-free ball condition 
contemplating whether to draw their first ball were in identical economic situations, and 
remained so on all subsequent trials. Psychologically, however, they were in very
different positions having made different amounts of progress toward drawing the WB. 
Because participants in both conditions faced identical economic consequences, the 
results cannot be explained by post-decisional regret and cognitive dissonance.  
Experiment 1 showed that individuals proportionally closer to drawing the WB 
were more likely to irrationally escalate compared to those who were proportionally 
farther from drawing it, despite the economic consequences and progress informat on 
being transparent. The next set of experiment aims to replicate the pattern observed in 
Experiment 1 when the amount of sunk costs is opaque. There are many tasks that do not 
involve investment and sunk costs are difficult to track (e.g., in the case of effort). Pri r 
research suggests that individuals attribute more value to their chosen course of action 
when sunk costs and economic payoffs are opaque (Camerer & Weber, 1999; Schultz-
Hardt et al., 2008), which suggests that the subjective value of the course underlies 
individuals’ tendencies to escalate. In short, when project’s potential payoffs and costs 
are opaque, the desirability of project completion should determine individuals’ 
tendencies to escalate, which should be related to the value individuals attribute to the 
project.  
Experiment 2 also aims to rule out the possibility that individuals in the 5-free ball 




often and had a larger pool of experimental points than those in the 0-free ball condition. 
The increase in the availability of funds might have caused participants in the 5-fre  ball 
condition to be less sensitive to the potential losses. Experiment 2 attempted to rule out 
this possibility by testing predictions that stem directly from the assumption of increased 




Chapter 3: Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. One hundred fifty-one undergraduates from the University of 
Maryland participated in this experiment in exchange for partial course credit and a 
chance to win a coffee mug contingent on performance. 
Design and Procedure. Upon entering the lab, participants saw six mugs displayed 
on the table and were told that they could earn one contingent on their performance. Their 
task was to solve a series of verbal puzzles, which consisted of anagrams in Part 1 of the 
experiment and a word search in Part 2. The experimental manipulation took place in Part 
1.   
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions, 
termed Proximate, Distant, and Moderate. The conditions were so named because of the 
proportional distance from the goal we expected participants in each one to be in by the 
end of Part 1 (See Table 1). In the Proximate and Distant Conditions, participants had to 
solve 40 problems to earn a mug and in the Moderate Condition, they had to solve 30. In 
the Distant and Moderate Conditions, they were faced with 20 easy and 20 hard anagrams 
in part 1, while in the Proximate condition they were faced with 30 easy and 10 hard 
problems. Thus, as Table 1 illustrates, we expected participants in the Proximate 
Condition to be approximately 75%, those in the Moderate approximately 66% of the 
way, and those in the Distal approximately 50% of the way towards their goal by the end 
of Part 1. 
Anagrams appeared sequentially and participants could skip any of them by typing 




ratings between 100 and 200 (e.g., lagan, pavis) drawn from the MRC Psycholinguistic 
Database (Wilson, 1988). In contrast, easy anagrams comprised common 4-letter words 
with familiarity ratings between 600 and 700 (e.g., girl, beer). The anagrams were pre-
tested on 45 participants, who all solved all the easy anagrams, while no one solved more 
than 10% of the hard anagrams.  
After finishing the anagrams, all participants were told how many correct answers 
they had accomplished, and the number of problems they still needed to solve in Part 2 in 
order to attain a mug. Next, participants were prompted to draw a rectangle on the 
computer screen that best represented the mug they had seen on the table. Participants 
could drag the edges of a rectangle to change its size. The rectangle area s rved as a 
proxy for the subjective value that individuals accorded the mug (Bruener & Goodman, 
1947). Upon completing the rectangle, participants decided whether to continue on to 
Part 2, which consisted of a word-search puzzle on which they only needed to find the 
number of words necessary to attain a mug. The puzzle was a matrix of 15 x 15 letters 
with 30 animal names embedded in it. Instructions informed the participants that the 
puzzle theme was animals, but not what or where the hidden words were.  
Participants had an unlimited amount of time to work on the puzzle. The amount of 
time they spent on the task, controlled for the number of words they found, served as the 
measure of escalation. Participants could end the program once they had found enough 
words to win a mug or at the point they decided to withdraw from the study.  
Results  





Manipulation checks. There was a significant difference at the end of Part 1 across 
the three conditions in the number of verbal problems participants needed to solve before 
winning a mug. At the end of Part 1, participants in the Distant, Moderate, and Proximate 
Conditions needed to solve 19.60, 12.33, and 9.90 additional problems in order to win a 
mug, and this difference was significant,  F(2, 141) = 111.63,  p < .001. In addition, the 
proportions of participants who ultimately reached their goal differed across the 
conditions in a manner consistent with our manipulation. These proportions were 32%, 
60%, and 66% for the Distant, Moderate, and Proximate conditions, respectively, χ2(2) 
=16.23, p < .01.  
Main analyses. We look first at time per found word in Part 2 and then at drawn 
rectangle size as a function of experimental condition. As predicted, participan s spent 
more time on the second part of the experiment when they had completed a greater 
proportion of the goal (Figure 2). A one-way ANCOVA with average time per found 
word as the dependent variable and the number of problems solved correctly in the first 
part of the experiment as a covariate revealed that there was a significant difference in the 
amount of time participants spent on the word-search puzzle, F(2, 140) = 3.02, p = .05.4 
After adjusting for the number of words participants found in the first part of the 
experiment, participants spent an increasingly higher amount of time, on average, on the 
second part of the experiment (Ms =13.43 min, 15.75 min, and 17.54 min, for those in the 
Distal, Moderate, and Proximal conditions, respectively). Linear trend analysis showed 
that participants spent more time on the second part of the experiment as they closed in 
on their goal, F(1, 140) = 5.95, p < .02 (Table 2).  
                                                




Turning to the rectangle sizes, participants drew bigger rectangles when they were 
closer to the goal than when they were not (Table 3), F(2, 141) = 4.59, p < .02. Linear 
trend analysis showed that participants drew larger rectangles as they solved more verbal 
problems in Part 1 (Ms = 11.28 in2, 12.81 in2, and 14.39 in2, for the Distant, Moderate, 
and Proximate condition, respectively), F(1, 141) = 9.18, p < .01. Table 3 summarizes the 
results. 
Our hypothesis is that persistence in Part 2 is a function of subjective goal value, 
which increases as relative distance from the goal decreases. In other wrds, e are 
assuming that the persistence is not due to goal distance per s , but to the accompanying 
increased goal value. If that is so, and if drawn rectangle size is an indicator of subjective 
goal value, then a mediation test should show that the independent variable of Distant, 
Moderate, or Proximate Condition predicts time in Part 2 when rectangle size is not taken 
into account, but not when it is. Precisely this result occurred: Experimental condition— 
the goal distance—significantly predicted both participants’ persistence on the word-
search puzzle (B = 2.33, SE = .96, p < .05) and the size of the representation of the mug 
they drew (B = 1.55, SE = .51, p < .05). In addition, the size of the drawn representation 
of the mug significantly predicted participants’ persistence on the word-sea ch puzzle (B 
= .42, SE = .15, p <.01). Finally, when both the experimental manipulation and size of the 
drawn representation of the mug were included in the same equation predicting 
participants’ persistence on the puzzle, the experimental condition did not significantly 
predict the time participants spent on the word-search puzzle, B = 1.68, SE = .97, p <.09 
(Figure 4), suggesting that there is full mediation. Following the procedure described in 




bootstrapped-corrected estimate of the indirect effect size and showed the 95% 
confidence interval of the total indirect effect was between .07 and 1.44. The exclusion of 
0 indicates that mediation was significant.   
Discussion 
The pattern of results rules out the wealth effect as a plausible alternative 
explanation. Individuals accumulated no prior winnings, so they do not receive any 
“cushion” to increase their risk-taking propensities by taking more costly draws as they 
might have done in Experiment 1. Instead, the data support the contention that escalation 
tendency is related to the value individuals attribute to the goal and that the goal’s value 
increases as it is approached. Participants who were closer to the goal viewed th  mug as 
more valuable, as evidenced by the larger size they attributed to it, and consequently 
showed more persistence in working toward a mug.  
Experiment 2 studied how the value of the goal may increase as it is approached. 
While the results are suggestive, it is impossible to discern whether the behavior w s 
irrational. However, it should be noted that a claim about irrationality is difficult to make 
when value and cost of attaining the goal are subjective. The data only suggested that 
escalation was more pronounced as the goal was approached given that the payoff and 
cost were opaque. It was impossible to determine the rationality of spending additional 
time on the word-search puzzle. To circumvent this problem, Experiment 3 uses a 
different measure for irrationality, time spent on unsolvable problems when solvable 
problems are available, as an indicator for irrationality. Because there is no reason for 




or attain an object as its attainment is near, the time spent on unsolvable problems was 
used as a measure for irrational escalation of commitment.  
As discussed at the beginning of this paper, escalation of commitment refers to 
individuals’ tendencies to spend additional resources on a chosen course of action rather 
than quitting or moving to a new course. Experiment 3 aims to replicate the finding that 
participants attributed more value to the chosen course of action, and also examined how 
individuals evaluated a course that was not chosen. Past research on escalation of 
commitment has shown that decision-makers rarely consider alternatives once unk costs 
have been accumulated (Boulding, Morgan, & Staelin, 1997), and fail to consider the 
benefits of the foregone alternative (Northcraft & Neale, 1986). The joint effects of 
ignoring the alternatives and failing to fully incorporate the opportunity costs have 
therefore been suggested as the underlying causes for escalation once individuals have 
invested in a course of action. In a similar vein, research on goals and needs suggests that 
objects that do not relate to the goal are often devalued, presumably because motivation 
for pursuing those objects is inhibited so that it can be reserved for the focal goal (Brendl, 
Markman, & Messner, 2003; Markman, et al., 2007). Therefore, individuals have a 
higher level of motivation for attaining an object related to the need and less motivation 
for attaining objects that are unrelated to the activated need. The motivational difference 
is therefore assumed to influence how objects, both related and unrelated to the need, are 
valued and moreover cause the two values to be negatively related. In summary, the 
motivational strengths for goal-related and non-goal-related items differ, and an increase 




However, Zajonc (1968) has contended that mere exposure to an object increases 
affinity for it, which suggests that once noticed an object’s value increases. In light of 
these competing predictions, Experiment 3 is designed to explore the effect of proximity 
to the goal on the subjective value of goal as well as of an achievable alternative to it. I 
hypothesize that as individuals approach the goal, the need and motivation for it 





Chapter 4: Experiments 3 and 4 
Experiment 3 extends the results in the previous study and tests the hypothesis that 
the goal proximity exacerbates the difference in value between the goal and its antithesis, 
which in turn, drives individuals to escalate irrationally in their chosen course of action. I 
manipulated goal proximity while eliciting values participants placed on both the goal 
and the alternative and hypothesized that the price differential between the two objects 
underlies individuals’ tendencies to escalate commitment. 
Method 
Participants. One-hundred-nineteen undergraduates from the University of 
Maryland participated in this experiment in exchange for partial course credit and a 
chance to receive either a chocolate bar or monetary payment. 
Design and Procedure. Participants first attempted thirty anagrams that were 
randomly drawn from the stimuli used in Experiment 2, such that half were easy and the 
remaining half were difficult. Prior to taking the experiment, participants learned that 
they could win a 3.5 oz. chocolate bar (big prize) if they solved enough anagrams on the 
computer; otherwise they would receive an 1.2 oz chocolate bar (consolation prize). 
Participants were then randomly assigned to either the Proximate or Distant condition, 
the difference being that those in the Proximate condition were told that they needed to 
solve 20 anagrams to win a big chocolate bar and those in the Distant condition were told 
they needed to solve 25.  
Anagrams appeared sequentially and participants could skip any anagram they 




participants the two experimental conditions did not engender different levels of affect,
participants filled out a brief measure of positive and negative affect scale (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) after they completed the anagrams. At that time, they 
also indicated their selling prices for both the big and consolation prizes. The true slling 
price was elicited using the Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak procedure (BDM; ecker, 
DeGroot, & Marschak, 1964). Participants indicated their selling prices by circling a 
value in a list that ranged from $0.25 to $3.00 in $0.25 increments for the big prize and 
from $.25 to $2.00 in $0.25 increments for the consolation prize. Participants had the 
option to not sell the prize by indicating that they had no intention to sell it to the 
experimenter. 
Next, all participants were told the number of correct answers they had achieved, 
and the number of correct problems they still needed to solve in order to win the big 
prize. They were reminded again that failure to reach the required goal would res t in 
their receiving the consolation prize. Participants assigned to the Proximate condition 
learned that there were 20 additional anagrams available and that they only needed to 
solve a sufficient number to win the big prize. In contrast, participants assigned to the 
Distant condition learned that there were 25 additional anagrams available. Two 
unsolvable word-strings (easeh and alaen) appeared sometime during the first four 
anagrams. Time spent on these word-strings constituted our index of persistence. The 
experiment ended whenever participants successfully found a sufficient number of 
anagrams to win the big prize, they exhausted all anagrams, or they gave up.  
Upon completion, the experimenter conducted the BDM procedure to determine 





The response “never sell to the experimenter” was coded as $3.25 and $2.25 for the 
big and consolation prize, respectively. Neither the positive nor the negative affect scores 
differed between the Proximate and Distal Conditions. 
Selling prices. Figure 5 depicts the average selling prices for the big and 
consolation prize as function of goal distance. A 2 (prize: Big v. Consolation) x 2 
(distance: Proximate v. Distant) mixed ANOVA with repeated measure on the first factor 
revealed that the only significant main effect was the prize condition, F(1, 112) = 407.43, 
ηp = .81,  p < .001. The average selling price for the big prize (M = $2.21, SE = .07) was 
above that of the consolation prize (M = $1.42, SE = .06). Consistent with the main 
hypothesis, the significant interaction Prize X Distance showed participants in the 
Proximate condition valued the big prize more than those in the Distant condition, but the 
same participants also showed a stronger tendency to devalue the consolation prize, F(1, 
112) = 4.01, p < .05, ηp = .04. The average selling price of big prize for participants in the 
Proximate condition was $2.33 (SE = .10), as opposed to $2.25 (SE = .09) for participants 
in the Distant condition. Those in the Proximate condition valued the consolation prize at 
$1.28 (SE = .07) on average, compared to $1.40 (SE = .07) for those in the Distant 
condition. However, results are qualified by a closer examination on the simple effects 
which revealed that these differences were not significant. 
Time spent on unsolvable word-strings. Consistent with the hypothesis that those 




spent on unsolvable word-strings was higher in the Proximate (M = 1.72 min, SE = .16), 
than in the Distant condition (M = 1.33 min, SE = .10), F (1, 117) = 3.91, p = .05.5 
Mediation of escalation tendency by changes in value attributions. Our hypothesis 
contends that the value difference between the big and consolation outcomes, as indicated 
by the difference in their selling prices, is the main underlying reason why individuals 
escalate commitment. I conducted a mediation analysis to test this hypothesis by 
regressing the price differential and time spent on unsolvable word-strings onto the 
experimental condition separately and found that experimental condition significantly 
predicted the difference in prices between the big and consolation prize, B = -.18, SE = 
.08, p < .05, and time spent on unsolvable word-strings, B = -.37, SE = .19, p < .05. The 
price differential also significantly predicted the time spent on unsolvable word-strings,  
B = .88, SE = .19, p < .001. Finally, when both the experimental manipulation and price 
differential were included in the same equation predicting participants’ persistence on the 
puzzle, the former became nonsignificant and the latter remained significant (B = -.20, SE 
= .18, p = .28, and B = .83, SE = .20, p < .01, respectively), indicating a full mediation. 
Following the procedure described in Preacher & Hayes (2004), I tested the significance 
of mediation effect by conducting a bootstrapped-corrected estimate of the indirect effect 
size and showed the 95% confidence interval of the total indirect effect was between -.37 
and -.01. The exclusion of 0 indicates that mediation was significant. Figure 6 
summarizes the mediation results. 
                                                
5 Five participants did not fill out the selling prices before attempting the unsolvable 
word-strings. They were not included in the analysis on selling prices but were included 





Experiment 3 suggests that the value of the goal increased and that of its alternative 
decreased as the completion of the course neared. Participants in both conditions 
completed the same number of anagrams in the first part of the experiment, yet, the  
spent more time on the unsolvable word-strings in the Proximate than in the Distant 
condition. The price differential fully mediated the goal distance and the time participan s 
spent on unsolvable word-strings. The mediation model indicates that escalation of 
commitment was influenced by the exaggerated difference between the value of the 
chosen course and its alternative as individuals became closer to attaining the goal. 
Proximity to completion exacerbates the price differential between the chosen course and 
its alternative, thereby driving individuals to continue to engage in the same cours, 
However, the results might in part due to the combined effects of having a ceiling 
on the possible bids and to having that value lower for the small than the large candy bar.  
In this experiment, participants could only indicate their selling prices to up to $2.00 for 
the small chocolate bar and $3.00 for the big chocolate bar. This design feature raises the 
possibility that the devaluation effect observed in the experiment might be due to the 
lower limit for the small chocolate bar than for the large one. However, as Figure 7 
shows, the ceiling effect was more pronounced for the selling price of the big chocolate 
bar, suggesting that the ceilings may actually have created a more conservative test for 
the devaluation hypothesis. In light of this, Experiment 4 tests the prediction that a more 
pronounced devaluation effect as a function of goal distance will occur if the ceilings are 
eliminated. I conducted a follow-up experiment testing this hypothesis by changing the 







Participants. Thirty-six participants (30 undergraduates and six graduate students) 
from the University of Maryland participated in this experiment in exchange for partial 
course credit and a chance to receive either a chocolate bar or monetary payment. 
Design and Procedure. The design and procedure were identical to the previous 
experiment except that participants wrote down their own selling prices for both big and 
small chocolate bars. Participants had the freedom to write down any selling prices they 
wish. However, unbeknownst to the participants, the highest price that the experiment  
was willing to offer was $4.00 for the big and $3.00 for the small chocolate bar. 
Therefore, participants had no chance of selling their chocolate bars back to the 
experimenter if they had indicated a selling price beyond the experimenter’s maximum 
price. Participants’ final earnings were rounded up to the nearest quarter if the chocolate 
bar was sold back to the experimenter. 
Results and Discussion 
Two participants failed to provide selling prices. They were included in the analysis 
on time spent on the unsolvable word-strings but were excluded from all other analyses. 
A 2 (prize: Big v. Consolation) x 2 (distance: Proximate v. Distant) mixed ANOVA with 
the first factor as a repeated measure revealed that there is a significant interaction 
between the two factors, F(1, 32) = 10.35., ηp = .186,  p < .01. Note that the effect size is 
higher than one found in Experiment 3, providing tentative evidence that the ceiling 




significant interaction, consider the simple effects. The average selling price for the big 
and small chocolate bar in the Proximate condition was $2.50 (SE = .18) and $1.64 (SE = 
.13), respectively. The difference was statistically significant, F(1 32) = 30.92,  p < .01. 
In contrast, the average selling for the big and small chocolate bar in the Distant 
condition was $1.83 (SE = .15) and $1.59 (SE = .09), respectively. The difference was not 
statistically significant F(1, 32) = 2.92,  p < .10. Figure 8 depict the results and showed 
the price differential to be more pronounced in the Proximate compared to the Distant
condition. 
The total amount of time spent on unsolvable word-strings was higher in the 
Proximate (M = 1.78 min, SE = .26), than in the Distant condition (M = 1.23 min, SE = 
.15). However, the difference was t(34) = 1.82, p = .039, one tailed.  
I forego the mediation analysis because sample size is too small to lend to 
traditional mediation analysis. However, the increase in the devaluation effect combined 
with the distributions of selling prices for both the big and small chocolate bars in 
Experiment 4 suggest that an increase in the sample size will provide a similarpattern of 




Chapter 5:  General Discussion 
The current paper sets out to (1) examine whether irrational escalation can occur 
when the sunk costs are either opaque or transparent and (2) provide an explanation of 
escalation not in terms of sunk costs, but in terms of increased object’s value associated 
with decreased distance from attaining the object (goal). With regard to point (1), 
Experiment 1 shows that individuals do irrationally escalate even when costs, payoffs, 
and the rational course of action are made apparent to them. Moreover, escalation was 
greater when sunk costs were low than when they were high. Experiments 2 and 3 
generalize the escalation results to cases in which sunk costs are opaque and a rational 
strategy cannot be derived. In all three experiments, the total experimental poi ts invested 
and the number of problems participants had solved previously did not change the level 
of escalation. 
With regard to point (2), Experiment 2 showed that object’s value, as indexed by 
perceived size of the outcome, increased as relative goal distance decreased. Particularly 
relevant to our explanation, a mediation analysis showed that the effect of goal distance 
on persistence was due entirely to changes in goal value. Experiments 3 and 4 replicated 
these results and showed, moreover, that the perceived value of an alternative to the 
chosen course for attaining the object decreased in value as distance from its attainment 
decreased.  
Our explanation is based on the goal-gradient hypothesis, which states that the 
speed of locomotion is negatively related to the distance from the goal (Hull, 1932). This 
empirical finding has been extended recently to different facets of consumer behaviors 




paper show that motivation for goal attainment can also be translated into economic 
decision-making. All four experiments showed that individuals’ spent increasing sums of 
resources as they approached the goal, irrespective of the amount of sunk costs they had 
incurred.  
Why does goal proximity increase the attractiveness or value of the goal and 
therefore the motivation to attain it? The traditional goal theories proposed that an 
incomplete goal causes “quasi needs” in which the need to achieve the goal increases du  
to mounting tension during the period in which the goal remains unfinished (Lewin, 
1935). More recent theories provide alternative perspectives on the question. Thus, 
research on goal instrumentality has shown that stimuli that are related to the g al 
received more attention than stimuli that are not (Ratneshwar, Warlop, Mick, & Seeger, 
1997). Studies on goal pursuit have shown that individuals can unconsciously direct 
attention to concepts that are related to the focal goal while inhibiting unrelated concepts 
(Förster, Liberman, & Higgins, 2005; Moskowitz, Li, & Kirk, 2004; Shah, Friedman, & 
Kruglanski, 2002). It has also been argued that self-regulation and limited cognitive 
resources guide individuals’ capacities to attend to the goal-relevant concepts while 
shielding concepts unrelated to the goal (Bandura & Cervone, 1983; Carver, 2004; Carver 
& Scheier, 1998; Higgins, 1987; Kernan & Lord, 1988), and that the increase in the goal-
relevant knowledge and concepts helps individuals to choose appropriate means for goal 
attainment (Förster, Liberman, & Higgins, 2005; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996). In 
summary, various goal theories all posit in one way or another that an increase in goal-
relevant attention and knowledge drive individuals to continue pursue the same goal. 




change as they approach it. 
In this paper, I find evidence to support the contention that the value gap between 
the chosen and foregone course of action will grow as individuals continue to commit to 
the same course of action, making the pursued goal  subjectively more valuable than 
alternatives. This gap plays a central role in determining individuals’ tendencies to 
escalate and provides a theoretical explanation as to why individuals escalat . The 
experiments build on the goal-gradient hypothesis in that the proximity to the goal 
increases the value of it but decreases the value of alternatives to it, making the chosen 
course more appealing to pursue.  
Implications for escalation research 
Research on escalation of commitment has primarily focused on individuals’ 
failures to withdraw from a course after sunk costs have been incurred, with little regard 
for how individuals evaluate alternatives to their chosen course. The sunk costs account
provides no clear theory on how individuals evaluate the chosen course and its 
alternatives. In contrast, the current paper proposes a new explanation for escalation of 
commitment based on evaluations of multiple outcomes. According to this explanation, 
the price differential between the goal and its alternative fully mediated the goal distance 
and the time participants spent on unsolvable word-strings. The mediation model 
indicates that escalation of commitment is influenced by the increased difference between 
the value of the goal and its alternatives as individuals come closer to attaining he goal. 
This increasing value differential drives individuals to persist in their goal pursuit as the 




Whyte (1993) has argued that the relationship between sunk costs and escalation of 
commitment may be an artifact because past escalation research rarely p ovides 
information on alternative choices, leaving the participants with only an altertive of 
disengagement during the course of escalation. In this paper, an alternative was made 
available and participants were guaranteed to receive the alternative without putting forth 
any effort. The data in Experiment 3 showed participants who were closer to the goal 
spent more time on the unsolvable word-strings. The presence of an alternative did not 
reduce escalation as suggested in Whyte (1993). Instead, the alternative object was 
devalued by the participants and served to motivate participants to escalate their 
commitment in hope to attain the big prize. Future research should look more closely at 
the role of alternatives in influencing escalation towards a given goal. 
Implications for motivational research 
Classical motivational models generally stress that commitment to a goal is based on 
the multiplicative effect of goal’s value and expectancy (e.g., Lewin, 1935; Vroom, 
1964). Expectancy is often related to goal proximity by assuming that a decreas  in goal 
distance increases the expectancy of goal attainment (Gjesme, 1981), so motivation is the 
product of goal distance and value of the object. However, results from this paper sugg st 
that the level of motivation depends largely on the goal expectancy and value is not 
independent of goal expectancy. Therefore, goal expectancy may play a moreimp tant 
role in determining individuals’ commitments to their goals than previously assumed, in 
that the value could be exaggerated due to an increase in goal expectancy. Instead of 
motivation being a function of value and expectancy, a more generalized function 




Limitations and future research 
One possible concern about our research is that none of the tasks carries significant 
consequences. Experiment 1 used hypothetical gambles and Experiment 2 and 3 used 
anagrams to test persistence, which was further removed from the economic domain. 
Future research would be valuable that extends the current findings to naturalistic settings 
for external validity, which would broaden the applicability of escalation research. 
Another possible research direction might involve manipulating the framing of the 
goal pursuit as either distance traveled towards or distance remaining from the goal. 
Recent research reveals that the progress towards and the distance remaining from the 
goal have opposite effects on individuals’ tendencies to escalate. Moreover, individuals 
who are highly committed to the course of action are more motivated when they learn 
about the distance remaining whereas those who are less committed are more motivated 
by information on how much progress they have made (Koo & Fishbach, 2008). High 
sunk costs, accountability, and a threat of having personal performance monitored all 
have been found to increase the level of commitment to the goal. Although the format of 
progress presentation is pertinent only when the task is completed half-way and its 
eventual completion is uncertain, it would be of interest to test whether different fomats 
of goal completion rates can engender a differential level of escalation when individuals 
face high (versus low) sunk costs or are (versus are not) held accountable. 
Conclusion  
Escalation of commitment has long been viewed as economically-motivated 
behavior, and its cause has been attributed to factors associated with sunk costs. 




causes individuals to redirect additional resources into the same project. However, th  
evidence to support this account is mixed in large part due to failure in providing 
information on costs and benefits. If escalation of commitment is an irrational economic 
decision, then information on costs and payoffs should be provided to test the economic 
rationality of escalation. The best-known scenarios (e.g., A&S investments, discount 
versus full ticket price, etc.) that purportedly demonstrated the escalation tendency have 
not provided such information. This has led some researchers to assume that sunk costs 
would cause escalation only when economic information is opaque (Heath, 1995), but 
experimental evidence shows that opaque sunk costs and payoffs had no effect on 
escalation (Soman, 2001). 
This paper provides an alternative to explain escalation of commitment, in which I 
show that individuals’ tendencies to escalate are sensitive to distance from completing the 
chosen course of action. Moreover, the distance from the completion of the chosen course 
gives rise to the change in the valuation of the pursued course and affected individuals’ 
tendencies to escalate. Individuals seem to rely on information regarding distance from 
the goal to determine whether to commit escalation, and results from this paper sugg sts 
that the reliance on distance applies to situations where costs and payoffs are both 
transparent and opaque.  
Decades of research on escalation have provided innumerable evidence to show that 
sunk costs are linked to escalation of commitment. Therefore, it is important to note that 
sunk costs can take on many forms. This paper designed sunk costs as costs of 
completing the course of action for attaining an object, but individuals often treat sunk 




O’Reilly, 1982; Sivanathan, Molden, Galinsky, & Ku, 2008). When viewed as an 
economic cost, high sunk costs may mitigate any escalation tendency, but the tendency 
emerges when sunk costs threaten self-esteem (Sivanathan et al., 2008). A high level of 
sunk costs has the capacity to induce commitment escalation in individuals and 
organizations when the costs become psychologically meaningful. 
The results of this study lead one to wonder whether we inevitably set ourselves up 
for disappointment when we focus on attaining a specific goal. In a Calvin and Hobbes 
comic strip, Calvin buys a box of cereal for the toy inside. Eager to finish the cereal for 
the toy, Calvin eats three bowls of cereal each morning (not for its taste) whil  imagining 
increasingly more wild scenarios of all the fun he will have with the toy. Eventually, it is 
revealed that the plastic toy cannot live up to Calvin’s expectations. Just as with the 
participants in the study, both Calvin’s motivations and judgments are influenced by goal 
proximity. When individuals get closer to achieving their goal, the goal does ind ed loom 









Overview of the Procedure in Experiment 2 
 Number of anagrams must solve 
Anagram difficulty Forty anagrams Thirty anagrams 
30 difficult/10 easy anagrams Proximate (75% complete)  






The adjusted time, in minutes, participants spent on the word-search puzzle as a function 
of the proportion of completed goal in Experiment 2 (± 1 SE of the mean). 
 Experimental Conditions 
 Distant Moderate Proximate 






The mean size of the rectangle (in2) drew by participants as a function of the proportion 
of completed goal in Experiment 2 (± 1 SE of the mean). 
 Experimental Conditions 
 Distant Moderate Proximate 






A sample trial in Experiment 1. Numbers that are italicized are provided to the 
participants in the experiment in the high sunk costs condition. 
 
 
Draw P(success) Payoff Cost Expected value Tot sunk costs
1 1/10 500 -38 50.00 -38
2 1/9 500 -44 55.55 -82
3 1/8 500 -52 62.5 -134
4 1/7 500 -62 71.43 -196
5 1/6 500 -76 83.33 -272
6 1/5 500 -95 100 -367
7 1/4 500 -125 125 -492
8 1/3 500 -170 166.67 -662
9 1/2 500 -260 250 -922





The adjusted time (min) participants spent on the word-search puzzle as a function of the 


































The mean size of the rectangle (in2) drew by participants as a function of the proportion 









































Model illustrating goal value mediating the relationship between goal distnce and time 
spent on the second part of the experiment in Experiment 2. 
 
 
2.33*  (1.68) 
Goal proximity 
condition 
Size of the 
rectangle 
-.18* .88* 
Note. * p <.05 






 Average selling price for both big and consolation prizes as a function of goal distance in 



















Model illustrating goal value mediating the relationship between goal distnce and time 
spent on the second part of the experiment in Experiment 2. 







Note. * p <.05 






The distribution of selling prices indicated by the participants for big and chocolate bars 




















































Average selling price for both big and consolation prizes as a function of goal distance in 
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